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Do social movements encourage young people to run for office? 
Evidence from the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan 
 
 
Abstract 
The 2014 Sunflower Movement led to rising political participation among young 
Taiwanese. Hence, opposition parties and civic groups created programs to 
support young candidates running in the village chief elections. Compared with 
the 2010 election, however, fewer young challengers ran in 2014, and they 
received fewer votes and won fewer seats. Propensity score matching shows that 
the presence of young candidates on ballots did not increase turnout. However, 
young candidates affected the election indirectly: young, new candidates 
attracted more votes from incumbents than from challengers and therefore 
decreased the incumbent reelection rate. 
 
Keywords. Social Movements, Local Elections, Youth Political Participation, Sunflower 
Movement, Taiwanese Politics 
 
  
Introduction 
The March 2014 Sunflower Movement was undoubtedly one of the most important events 
in Taiwan’s recent political development. Hundreds of thousands of protesters occupied 
Parliament (the Legislative Yuan) and the surrounding blocks, requiring authorities to reconsider 
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and to decelerate cross-strait economic 
cooperation. This peaceful occupation successfully stopped the ruling party's plan to pass the 
CSSTA and won support for more supervision of the agreement (Ho 2015). 
A salient feature of the Sunflower Movement is the age of its participants – they are mostly 
members of the young generation. According to an on-site survey conducted during the movement 
by Chen (2014), the average age of the participants was 28, and 67% of participants were younger 
than 30. Moreover, 56% of the participants were students, although nearly half of the protesters 
had graduated. Another online survey conducted on the third day of the movement (PollcracyLab 
2014) showed that 81% of subjects under 30 supported the occupation, compared to 32% of the 
subjects over 50. Therefore, the Sunflower Movement is characterized as a movement of young 
people rather than of students exclusively.  
In a democratic system, the legitimacy of power and policies is provided by general 
elections. Since the Sunflower Movement was vividly imaged as the young generation, young 
people were also expected to play an essential role in the local election later that year: they had 
come out to protest, so they might be willing to run in local elections against members of the ruling 
party, Kuomintang (KMT). Indeed, researchers have noted that the grievances of the young 
generation actively contributed to KMT's losses in the 2014 local elections (Hsieh 2015; Subba 
2016). 
Beyond getting out the vote, young Taiwanese could influence the upcoming local 
elections directly by running for office. Notably, the major opposition party, the Democratic 
Progress Party (DPP); the small, pro-independence party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU); and 
numerous civic groups actively encouraged young people to run for office in the 2014 village 
elections.0F1 These groups believed that young candidates could "overturn local politics" by means 
of the framing effect of the Sunflower Movement. 
Given the atmosphere and resources favoring the young generation, its role in the 
upcoming elections was an open question. Would the sunflower also bloom in local politics? Most 
previous studies of the effect of the Sunflower Movement on Taiwan politics have focused on the 
movement itself, rather than on its effects on the next local elections, which occurred seven months 
after the end of the movement (Ho 2015). Those studies connecting the Sunflower Movement to 
elections have assumed that young people had substantial effects on election outcome by voting 
(Hsieh 2015; Subba 2016). Indeed, the question of whether the movement benefitted young 
candidates has been neglected. This article focuses on the performance of young candidates in the 
post-Sunflower village and chief elections. If the energy of the movement carried into the election 
and the resources provided to candidates were helpful, then empirical evidence of these effects 
should be found in the 2014 village election results. For example, more young candidates were 
expected to run for office and to receive more votes than during the previous election. 
Examining the performance of young candidates in the 2014 village elections is especially 
important owing to the context in which this election was embedded. Human beings are mortal. 
Age is one of many critical personal characteristics of candidates that serve as cognitive heuristics 
                                                          
1 These are the “village and li chief elections.” Li is a special unit in Taiwan, which will be discussed in the next 
section. Since the village and li chief served at the same level of administration, this article groups them together and 
uses the term “village chief elections” for brevity. 
of competitiveness and quality (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). People tend to match specific jobs with 
specific age groups (e.g., Perry, Kulik, and Bourhis 1996; Perry and Bourhis 1998). In politics, 
middle-aged candidates are usually preferred to those who are considered too young or too old 
(Banducci et al. 2008; Armstrong and Graefe 2011): youth implies inexperience, while old age 
suggests inability. 
The 2014 village elections in Taiwan provide an extreme but generalizable case study. In 
most democracies, young candidates are less competitive because of their lack of experience and 
their opponents’ incumbent advantage, and the young generations are always under-represented 
(Thompson and Singh 2018). Such an ageism routinely happens that people even see the young 
candidate as less competitive in the experiment controlling for all other candidates’ social-
demographic backgrounds (Berggren et al. 2010). However, previous studies assumed the ageism 
(rather than the candidate’s age) as a constant rather than a variable. The 2014 village elections in 
Taiwan offer a unique opportunity for researchers to explore what will happen when the constant 
was shaken by a large-scale social movement. Since the atmosphere and resources favored young 
candidates, they should have performed better than young candidates in previous elections, 
controlling for the existing electoral system (single-member districts and a national bipartisan 
system) and political culture. If young candidates did not perform better in this election than in 
previous ones, the existing system may discriminate against young candidates to such an extent 
that even a powerful social movement composed of young people and additional electoral 
resources failed to overcome.  
 
Village Chiefs, the Sunflower Movement, and Opposition Parties 
In Taiwan, the village chief is the elected representative at the lowest level of 
administration. The Japanese colonial government created the village chief as part of a system of 
social control (Yao 2008a). After the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the position 
was opened to electoral competition, but it was soon integrated into the party machine of electoral 
mobilization and clientelism in the context of military rule (Wang 1997; Yao 2008b). Although 
Taiwan started its democratization process in 1987, the majority of village chiefs were KMT 
members or tended to support the KMT. They did not necessarily join the KMT because the 
districts were small enough that they could connect to enough voters to win an election without 
using the party brand (Wang 2015b). 
Therefore, members of DPP, TSU, and civil groups believed that village incumbents 
contributed to the KMT base, so if new, young candidates stemming from the Sunflower 
Movement defeated these village chiefs, the could uproot the influence of the KMT in local politics. 
To achieve this goal, financial and educational resources and even party nominations were 
provided to encourage young people to run in the 2014 village elections. Such plans included the 
DPP's Democracy Grass,1F 2 the TSU's Young People Running in Village Elections,2F 3 and civic 
groups, such as Let's Run in the Village Elections3F4 and Youth Occupy Politics.4F5 For example, in 
the Democracy Grass plan, the DPP helped young candidates create slogans, campaign videos, 
and business cards; provided funding of thirty thousand New Taiwan Dollars (about USD $1000); 
and provided campaign consulting services, campaign volunteers, and local canvassers.5F 6 
Moreover, the DPP did not nominate other candidates in districts in which young candidates had 
                                                          
2 http://www.grass.tw/ 
3 https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.825430654136514.1073741877.191702400842679\&type=1 
4 https://www.facebook.com/eeemmt 
5 https://www.facebook.com/YouthOccupyPolitics 
6 https://www.storm.mg/article/35621 and https://www.thenewslens.com/article/5471. Access: October 9, 2018 
registered. The plan was proposed and led by Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP leader who won the 2016 
presidential election. 
The strategies implemented by the DPP and other groups drew the attention of both 
domestic and international media outlets.6F7 The deadline to sign up for the village elections was 
September 5, 2014, which indicated that candidates had at least five months after the Sunflower 
Movement to make the decision to run for office and to prepare for the elections. 
Many young candidates also ran in the local council elections. However, the cost of running 
in a council election is considerably higher than that of a village election given the size of the 
district and the competitiveness of the elections, and incumbent partisan candidates dominate most 
of these districts. Therefore, cooperation between young candidates and the existing parties was 
quite complex, which may blur the relationship between generational effects and election results. 
The relationship between the Sunflower Movement and the council elections was reported on 
several times, and its relationship to the village elections received some media exposure. For 
example, between November 30 (Election Day) and May 30, 2014, the terms "Sunflower 
Movement" + "city council election" appeared 47 times in the Apple Daily, the biggest newspaper 
in Taiwan.7F8 During the same period, the terms "Sunflower Movement" + "village chief election" 
appeared 20 times, which was noticeable coverage. Therefore, it is reasonable to exploit the 2014 
village and chief elections to examine whether social movements push members of the young 
generation to run in elections. 
 
                                                          
7 Carnegie’s Civic Research Network reported, "In the 2014 election, the DPP launched a project called Democracy 
Grass (minzhu xiaocao) that sponsored young first-timers taking part in elections for village heads...The program 
was designed to be a goodwill gesture to young voters because it did not require participants to register under the 
DPP name. As a result, some candidates registered as nonpartisans." 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/02/activist-legacy-of-taiwan-s-sunflower-movement-pub-76966. Access: 
October 3, 2018 
8 https://tw.appledaily.com/search/. Access: October 3, 2018 
Exploring the Influence of Social Movements in Local Elections 
This article examines three different aspects to explore the performance of young 
candidates in the 2014 village elections: supply, demand, and spillovers. 
Supply Side 
First, if the Sunflower Movement raised the level of political participation among young 
people, more of them should have run in the upcoming elections. Winning in the elections is a 
direct way to punish the incumbent and to provide all voters with an alternative. If the Sunflower 
Movement was an effective treatment, we should observe more young candidates running in the 
post-Sunflower elections.  
There are two measures to test this supply-side hypothesis. The simple test is to compare 
the number of young candidates between this and last election. Alternatively, it could be possible 
that the political environment encouraged more people from all generations to run in this election 
so the overall number of candidates will increase, but the number of young candidates increased 
more than other generations. If it is the case, the proportion of young candidates should be higher 
than the previous election. 
 
H1-1: The number of young candidates in the village elections is higher in 2014 than in 2010 
H1-2: The proportion of young candidates in the village elections is higher in 2014 than in 2010 
 
Demand Side 
Second, the Sunflower Movement may have changed stereotypes of the young generation, 
or it might make the young generation a salient issue. For example, Madestam et al. (2013) found 
that a successful Tea Party protest (i.e., one not stopped by rainfall) increased public support for 
the Tea Party’s positions, and therefore increased the vote share of the Tea Party candidates in the 
upcoming election. Similarly, if the Sunflower Movement featured its young Taiwanese protesters 
and the young generation, the young candidates should be much more attractive in the election 
after the Sunflower Movement. 
Moreover, the Sunflower Movement was an essential political opportunity for parties to 
attract new supporters. For example, Kitschelt (1988; 1993) analyzed the emergence of left-
libertarian parties in Europe, and he argues that social movements provide motivation and attract 
educated and young voters. Although cleavages already existed and were made salient by the 
movement, it was the organized parties that exploited these cleavages and attracted voters in the 
elections after the social movement. 
In this case, young candidates should have received more votes than in previous elections. 
Moreover, young candidates may have increased voter turnout if people perceived a high expected 
utility of young candidates winning the election.  
 
H2-1: The vote share young candidates received is higher in 2014 than in 2010 
H2-2: The number of chief positions won by young candidates is higher in 2014 than in 2010 
H2-3: The turnout rate is higher in districts with young candidates than in those without 
 
Spillover Effects 
Apart from affecting demand and supply, the emphasis on the young generation of the 
Sunflower Movement may have created a new issue dimension for voters (Deegan-Krause 2007). 
Following the spatial theory of voting, an additional issue dimension may change the relative 
spatial distances among candidates and voters, which upends the status quo of local politics. The 
village chief is elected through a single-member district, so the entry of young candidates may 
reduce the vote shares of both incumbents and other challengers. 
In local elections, incumbents usually enjoy considerable advantages, and the village chief 
elections in Taiwan are no exception. Analyzing the results of the 2010 and 2014 village chief 
elections, Wang (2015b) suggests that incumbents received, on average, 10% more votes than 
opposition candidates. In 2014, 70.2% of incumbents were re-elected. 
Theories in behavioral psychology argue that people do not evaluate candidates in a 
vacuum; instead, voters’ evaluations of a candidate may be influenced by their perceptions of other 
candidates in the same election (e.g., Wang and Chen 2018). When a new and young candidate 
enters the race, this new face primes voters in the district to think of the Sunflower Movement that 
happened earlier in the election year. It is also likely that a young candidate actively inserts the 
element of youth into his/her campaign framing and encourages voters to think of this 
characteristic. 
Once a young candidate decided to step onto the battlefield, who would be influenced more? 
In Taiwan, previous electoral studies have yielded no consensus on the relationship between a 
candidate's age and his or her competitiveness. Some studies suggest that Taiwanese voters prefer 
middle-aged candidates in some elections (Huang and Lin2007; Wang 2015b), while others fail to 
find such a correlation (Sheng 2008; Hsu and Lin 2012; Wang 2015a). 
Most village chief incumbents were KMT based or KMT friendly, and previous studies 
show that young voters show less support for KMT (e.g. Ho et al. 2015; Hsieh 2016); thus, it is 
likely that young candidates and the new dimension of age in the post-Sunflower elections 
decrease the vote shares of challengers (mostly non-KMT or non-KMT-friendly) more than of 
incumbents. If a young candidate decides to run in a village and chief election instead of 
cooperating with the existing challenger, this decision would increase the difference between the 
incumbent and the challenger, making the incumbent less likely to step down. 
 
H3-1: Adding one young candidate to a district increases the incumbent's vote share 
H3-2: Adding one young candidate to a district increases the likelihood of the incumbent being 
reelected 
 
Data and Measures 
The 2014 and 2010 village elections are the only two for which results are available on the 
website of the Central Election Commission.8F9 Using the Sunflower Movement as a treatment, the 
hypothesis will be tested by comparing the results of the 2010 and 2014 elections. Data on each 
candidate’s age, gender, district, incumbency, and vote share are available on the website, which 
are sufficient for hypothesis testing. 
The hypotheses center on the term "young candidate," but what is the definition of young? 
In this article, candidates younger than 40 are defined as young candidates. This definition was 
used at the time by the two major parties, KMT9F10 and DPP10F11, to define their youth leagues and 
youth members. (After 2017, the threshold was changed to 35 by both parties.) 
Before proceeding with hypothesis testing, brief descriptions of the 2014 and 2010 village 
elections can help provide the context and characteristics of the elections. 
In the 2014 village elections, there were 7848 districts. Of the 14137 candidates, 2633 
(18.6%) were nominated by the KMT, 718 (5.1%) by the DPP, and 45 by other minor parties; most 
                                                          
9 http://db.cec.gov.tw/ 
10 http://www.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?id=13\&aid=2720 
11 http://www.grass.tw/ 
candidates were non-partisan. However, as previously mentioned, for historical reasons, most of 
these non-partisan candidates were pro-KMT. Overall, 6921 incumbents sought reelection, and 
5513 were successfully re-elected. Therefore, the reelection rate was about 70.2%, which was not 
uncommon in local elections with single-member districts.  
The 2010 village chief elections reflected similar patterns. In 2010, there were 7831 
districts. The number of districts differs from that in 2014 due to minor district realignments. Of 
the 15428 candidates, 3506 (22.7%) were from KMT, 583 (3.7%) from DPP, and six from minor 
parties. Again, most candidates were non-partisan. However, due to the growth of many counties 
and cities (and the creation of the five special municipalities), data on incumbency in the 2010 
election are incomplete. However, 74.5% of village chiefs were reelected in Taipei City, and 71.5 
% were reelected in counties excluding the five special municipalities. It is worth noting that the 
DPP nominated fewer candidates in this election, a phenomenon that should be explored in future 
research. 
Overall, the 2014 and 2010 village elections are similar in terms of many contextual factors. 
Therefore, a comparison of these two cycles can help estimate the influence of the Sunflower 
Movement that took place between them. 
 
Performance of Young Candidates after the Social Movement 
Supply Side: More Young Candidates? 
If the Sunflower Movement successfully raised the level of political participation of the 
young generation, and if the subsidies and resources provided by opposition parties and civic 
groups worked, then we should observe more young candidates in local elections. 
In the 2014 village elections, there were 730 candidates under age 40 or 5.2% of the 14137 
candidates. The average age of all candidates was 56.8, with a median of 58. In comparison, in 
2010, there were 901 young candidates or 5.8% of the 15428 candidates. The mean and median 
candidate age was 55.1 and 56, respectively. To consider the influence of incumbency, 599 of 730 
young candidates in 2014 were challengers, whereas in 2010, 797 of 901 candidates were 
challengers. 
It is possible that the overall number of young candidates was smaller in 2014 but that the 
number nominated by opposition parties increased.11F12 Testing such a hypothesis is not easy because 
the DPP’s plan included training for non-partisan candidates. If we only focus on young candidates 
nominated by the DPP, there were 70 candidates in 2014 (of 718, 9.8%) and 53 in 2010 (of 583, 
9.1%). A Chi-square test shows no statistical difference between the two years (p=0.55). Even 
though the DPP nominated more young candidates in 2014, the overall proportion was about the 
same as in 2010. Therefore, DPP nominations offer limited support for H1-1, but the evidence is 
far from sufficient to argue that the Sunflower Movement substantially affected the number of 
young people running in elections. 
Since these two datasets are for the population instead of samples, statistical testing is 
unnecessary; comparing the means is enough for falsification. The evidence fails to support H1-1 
and H1-2 – the number of young candidates did not increase after the Sunflower Movement, despite 
the resources provided and an atmosphere benefiting youth. 
 
Demand Side: Greater Support for Young Candidates? 
                                                          
12 I thank Reviewer 1 for this helpful comment. 
First, let us focus on the vote share. Although the Sunflower Movement failed to encourage 
more young people to run for office and provide an alternative on the ballot, it is possible that 
voters were influenced by the movement and found existing young candidates much more 
attractive. Therefore, voters turn out and support young candidates in the post-Sunflower election. 
In the 2014 election, young candidates received an average vote share of 42.2%, which is 
lower than the overall average of 55.5% (the percentage is larger than 50% due to many 
uncontested districts). In 2010, young candidates received 42.8% of the total votes. If we focus on 
districts with only an incumbent and a challenger (n=3276), on average, the challenger received 
44.5% of the total votes, but the vote share of young challengers was 43.4%. 
Moreover, 291 of 730 (39.9%) young candidates won their elections in 2014, but in 2010, 
the proportion was 390 of 901 (43.1%). Overall, 3.7% of winners in the 2014 election were under 
40; in 2010, the proportion was 5.0%. 
Once again, comparing 2010 and 2014 election results reveals that voters did not show 
more support for young candidates after the Sunflower Movement. The election results fail to 
support H2-1 and H2-2. 
If we focus on young candidates nominated by the DPP, they received 43.6% of the votes 
in 2014 and 41.8% in 2010 – a 1.8% difference. Regarding the chances of winning, young DPP 
candidates’ chances of winning were 48.8% in 2014 and 43.4% in 2010. However, this increased 
chance of winning was affected by the presence of young DPP incumbents. Of the 17 young DPP 
incumbents, 16 were reelected in 2014. Of the 53 young DPP challengers, only 16 defeated the 
incumbent (32.07%). In comparison, the DPP nominated 49 young challengers in 2010, and 20 of 
them defeated the incumbent (40.8%). Once again, the results for the DPP provide limited, if any, 
support for the two hypotheses. 
 Second, we can consider turnout. Theoretically, young candidates provide an alternative 
for which more people are willing to come out and vote. By this logic, a young candidate is defined 
as a treatment of existing local political competition. 
Figure 1 shows the average turnout rate under different scenarios, and the parentheses 
under each condition indicate the number of districts in the 2014 election. In this figure, the effect 
of adding one more young candidate to a district on turnout rate is limited. It is clear that the 
turnout rates in districts with one old and one young candidate are higher than in uncontested 
districts, but the effect is indiscernible in districts with two old candidates. In other words, 
competition spurs turnout, but the effect has nothing to do with the age of the candidates. Since 
the previous section clarifies that the number of young candidates did not increase, it also implies 
that the Sunflower Movement did not make elections much more competitive and had little effect 
on the turnout rate. 
 
Figure 1. Turnout Rate in Districts with Different Candidate Composition 
 
However, it is possible that there is an endogeneity problem when estimating the effect of 
young candidates on turnout. It is possible that the decision of a young candidate to run is related 
to the conditions of the district in previous elections. If so, the treatment of running as a young 
candidate is biased, and the estimation of the effect is therefore biased. 
To deal with this problem, Rubin (1974) suggests propensity score matching to estimate 
the treatment effect by matching close cases in the dataset. In the first step, the treatment 
assignment is estimated by using a logit model in which the dependent variable is binary (treated 
or not) and independent variables include all covariates that could influence the assignment. The 
model is then used to generate the probability that each case is treated, and cases with the same 
probability of treatment but different conditions (treated or not) are paired. This step helps 
eliminate bias in the treatment assignment. Then, all we need to do is compare the means of the 
treatment and control groups, and the difference is the estimated treatment effect. 
For the case of the 2014 village elections in Taiwan, the treatment is adding one more 
candidate (either young or old) to the district. The covariates include the effective number of 
candidates in the 2010 election, whether the incumbent is seeking reelection and the number of the 
electorate in the district. The MatchIt package is used for estimation in R using the nearest neighbor 
method with a ratio of 1. 
After propensity score matching, the pure effect on the turnout rate of an additional 
candidate in a district with a single candidate is 6.3% (p<0.000, from 66.6% to 72.9%). In 
comparison, the effect of adding one more young candidate is 4.5% (p<0.000, from 66.3% to 
70.8%). For districts with two candidates, the effect on turnout of an additional candidate is non-
significant (0.3%, p=0.41, from 71.8% to 72.0%); the effect is the same for an additional young 
candidate (0.59%, p=0.51, from 70.6% to 71.2%). Both point estimation and propensity score 
matching fail to support H2-3. 
To summarize, young candidates did not perform better in village elections in 2014 than in 
2010. They did not receive more votes after the Sunflower Movement. Moreover, the number of 
young chiefs dropped from 390 to 291 over those four years. In terms of increasing turnout, the 
effect of adding one more young candidate is indistinguishable from that of adding an older one. 
Overall, there is no evidence that the Sunflower Movement increased political participation of 
either candidates or voters in the 2014 village elections. 
 
Spillover Effects: Disrupting the Status Quo? 
In village elections in Taiwan, it is not uncommon for an incumbent to compete with the 
same challenger more than once. In the 7848 districts in the 2014 elections, 1247 (15.9%) 
incumbents faced the same opponent they had defeated four years ago. In 2014, the reelection rate 
was about 70.2%, which implies that challengers have a low chance of winning. However, many 
challengers were strong enough to fight more than once. For example, Tsai and Wang (2007) note 
that challengers in local politics create or become the leaders of community development 
associations in order to develop their ability to challenge incumbent village chiefs in the next 
election.  
What would happen if a young and inexperienced candidate suddenly jumped into the race 
and became a third option? Traditionally, competition in single-member districts like those for 
village elections centers on two major candidates. They mobilize voters through personal networks, 
clientelism, or party identity, all of which are relatively stable over time. A new face in the 
competition introduces at least one more issue dimension into the existing election context – age 
– which might change the relative distance between existing candidates and voters.  
In the 2014 village elections, 49 (of 1247) districts fit this scenario. The incumbent and the 
challenger ran in both 2010 and 2014, but a young candidate joined the race in 2014. To estimate 
the effect of additional young candidates, propensity score matching is used. The control group 
includes all districts with an incumbent and a repeat challenger, and the treatment group is defined 
as all districts with an incumbent, a repeat challenger, and a new young candidate. In the matching 
equation, the two independent variables are the number of effective candidates in the district in 
2010 and the size of the electorate. The number of effective candidates is used because it captures 
the chance of winning and quality of both the incumbent and the repeat challenger, while the size 
of the electorate captures the socioeconomic development of the district. After matching by the 
nearest neighbor method, 49 treatment-control pairs are selected.  
Figure 2 shows the effect of adding one more young candidate to the district on the vote 
share difference between the incumbent and the challenger. In the control group, which is shown 
in the figure as the red line with the 95% confidence interval, the vote share difference between 
the incumbent and the challenger in 2010 was, on average, 16.0%. In 2014, the difference narrowed 
to 8.1%; the incumbent received, on average, 54% of the vote share, while the challenger received 
46%. The smaller gap may be attribuetd to the increased competitiveness of the challenger or an 
incumbent disadvantage. For example, even though voters are choosing between the same options, 
many voters could change their minds based on retrospective considerations.  
 Figure 2. Effect of Adding a Young Candidate on the Gap between Incumbent and 
Challenger 
 
In the treatment group, however, the difference between incumbent and challenger is 
19.5% in 2010. In 2014, when a young candidate joined the race, the difference dropped sharply 
to 3.3%: the incumbent received 40.4% of the vote share, the challenger 37.1%, and the young 
candidate 22.5%, on average.  
This analysis is informative for many aspects of elections. A new, young candidate will 
attract votes from both the incumbent and the repeat challenger, but, on average, the incumbent is 
more affected. Even though the young candidate has the lowest chance of winning, he or she can 
indirectly influence the relative strength of the incumbent and the challenger. In the spatial model, 
the young candidate represents a new reference point, which makes the incumbent seem more 
extreme or the challenger seem more moderate. Therefore, the evidence clearly rejects H3-1 – 
adding one young candidate in fact decreases the gap between incumbent and challenger. 
A similar pattern can be found in Figure 3 for the change in reelection odds. In this figure, 
the dependent variable is the incumbent reelection rate in 2014. When competing against the same 
opponent without interference from other candidates (that is, in the control group), the winning 
rate in 2010 is 100% since they were incumbents in 2014. However, in 2014, the reelection rate is 
about 71.4%, which is close to the population mean (70.2%). When an additional young candidate 
joins the race, incumbent reelection rate drops precipitously to 45.0%. The evidence conflicts with 
H3-2. Therefore, adding a young candidate indirectly reduces the reelection rate.12F13 
 
Figure 3. Effect of Adding a Young Candidate on the Reelection Rate of the Incumbent 
 
Conclusion: The Flower Wilts? 
Did a social movement featuring youth political participation encourage more young 
people to run in and help them win local elections? An analysis of the performance of young 
candidates in the 2014 village elections in Taiwan reveals both bad and good news. The bad news 
is that there is no evidence that more young people chose to run in local elections after the 
Sunflower Movement, nor did they become much more attractive to Taiwanese voters. After the 
                                                          
13 As is suggested by the reviewers, it would be theoretically interesting to explore the effect of one more young 
candidate in the originally KMT vis-à-vis DPP districts. However, such cases were rare because most incumbent in 
the village elections are non-partisan even they were KMT-friendly, so it would not be statistically meaningful to 
focus on those cases. 
2014 elections, there were in fact fewer young chiefs than in 2010. The electoral resources 
provided by the DPP, TSU, and other civil groups did not significantly affect this election.  
The good news, however, is that once a young candidate decides to join the race, the 
evidence shows that he or she can indirectly change the results; the young candidate will not win, 
but he or she will help the challenger defeat the incumbent. 
In a democratic system, the most common and legitimate form of changing policies and 
holding authorities accountable is through elections that can replace the incumbent. As discussed 
at the beginning of this paper, the 2014 village elections provide an extreme but generalizable case. 
Given the atmosphere of the social movement and the electoral resources provided to candidates, 
more young people should have chosen to run in the 2014 elections. However, the empirical 
evidence does not support this expectation. 
This null finding suggests that the barriers to running in elections are high for Taiwanese 
young people given that the Sunflower Movement and additional resources failed to overcome 
them. Despite their ability to change election results, young people chose not to run. In Taiwan, 
people under 40 accounted for 38.4% of the adult population in 2014.13F14 Yet, in villages, less than 
5% of chiefs are young. The reasons for this pattern and discrimination against young candidates 
in Taiwan require further exploration; the Sunflower Movement seems to have not reduced this 
tendency. 
A possible explanation may stem from the function of the village chief. Although village 
chiefs were believed to be relevant to the ruling KMT, their actual power was insufficient to change 
policy at the national and county levels. Therefore, even though opposition parties and NGOs 
called for young candidates to alter local politics by becoming village chiefs, young people may 
                                                          
14 http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/month/list.htm 
prefer to be councilors or even legislators. These calculations within the young generation will be 
studied in the future. Moreover, opposition parties may have wasted their resources and 
miscalculated in their campaign strategies in the 2014 local elections. Therefore, future work 
should examine whether more young candidates run in the 2016 legislative elections than in the 
2012 elections. Nevertheless, it is still surprising that the Sunflower Movement had no direct effect 
on the decisions of young Taiwanese to run in the lowest-level elections. 
Achen and Wang’s (2019) recent analysis of the generation gap in turnout in Taiwan also 
speaks to this article. After correcting for overreporting, they found that turnout among the young 
voters dropped the most compared with other generations. Specifically, turnout rates among 20-
29- and 30-39-year-olds were much lower in 2016 than in 2012 and 2008. Achen and Wang’s 
results provide additional evidence that this social movement did not encourage young citizens to 
engage in politics in traditional ways, as suggested in this article. 
The third possible explanation of this result is the fluctuated and multi-dimensional support 
of the Sunflower Movement. Ho (2015) cited the TVBS polls conducted during the occupation, 
which showed that the 70% of Taiwanese people supported the occupation in the first few days 
(while 20% opposed the movement). But most of the supporters turned to non-responses after two 
weeks, and the level of support dropped from 70% to 26%. Meanwhile, the poll also showed that 
70% of respondents agreed with one of the main goals of the occupation: reviewing the CSSTA 
on an article-by-article basis. Therefore, it could be possible that the support toward the Sunflower 
movement ebbed faster than the expectation of the opposition parties, so their strategies of 
encouraging young candidates were not as effective as they planned.  
It is worth noting that this article does not distinguish between young candidates who were 
encouraged by the Sunflower Movement and those from political families. In Taiwan, it is 
common for the village chief's son, daughter, wife, or other relative to replace the incumbent. 
Therefore, both the incumbents and the young candidates are measured imprecisely and suffer 
from contamination. However, political family effects would have enhanced the performance of 
young candidates in the 2014 election, but improved performance was not observed. Therefore, I 
assume that the effects of political families do not influence the overall contribution of this article. 
However, future work should focus on the potential effects of political families on local elections 
and explore better measures of the incumbent.  
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